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Abstract 
We present an analysis of the topological structure and static tolerance to errors and attacks of 
the September 2003 actualization of the Union for the Coordination of Transport of Electricity 
(UCTE) power grid, involving thirty-three different networks. Though every power grid studied 
has exponential degree distribution and most of them lack typical small-world topology, they 
display patterns of reaction to node loss similar to those observed in scale-free networks. We 
have found that the node removal behaviour can be logarithmically related to the power grid 
size. This logarithmic behaviour would suggest that, though size favours fragility, growth can 
reduce it. We conclude that, with the ever-growing demand for power and reliability, actual 
planning strategies to increase transmission systems would have to take into account this 
relative increase in vulnerability with size, in order facilitate and improve the power grid design 
and functioning.  
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1 Introduction 
Mostly evolved over the last hundred and fifty years, technical infrastructures, from telegraph 
[Standage, 1998] to Internet [Pastor Satorras & Vespignani, 2004], are the canvas where almost 
every aspect of our economy and society is portrayed. From a broader historical perspective, 
networks of energy, transportation and communication constitute the very foundation of all 
prospering societies, as the western culture actually knows them. Being usually managed by 
different kinds of actors (often with different objectives), formed by a huge quantity of 
heterogeneous components (spatially distributed and connected) characterized by complex 
interdependencies and relations, the study of these technological systems deserves attention in 
order to assure, essentially, structural integrity, efficiency and  reliable supply. 
 
In recent years, one particular kind of network has received much attention: the power grid. 
Hailed by the US National Academy of Engineers as the 20th century’s engineering innovation 
most beneficial to our civilization, the role of the electric power has grown steadily in both 
scope and importance during this time and electricity is recognized as a key to societal progress 
throughout the world, driving economy prosperity, security and improving the quality of life 
[Willis, 2004]. With similar pace, though, increasing frequency and size of malfunctions have 
raised general awareness about our real level of comprehension of these networks. In recent 
years, both the North American and the (once almost faultless) European grid systems have 
experienced numerous examples of such malfunctions in the form of cascading failures and 
blackouts [Venkatasubramanian, 2003; UCTE, September, 2003]. The explanations given by 
local, national and international electricity coordinating councils for most of these situations go 
from aspects related to low investment and maintenance, to those related to generation and 
demand inadequateness and, obviously, bad luck. But more than any, the most repeated 
explanation is that of a bad comprehension of the interdependencies present in the network. 
[Watts, 2003; UCTE, 2004]  
 
In these sense, advances in statistical physics, modeling and computational methods have 
stimulated the interest of the scientific community to study electric power grids as complex 
networks. In complex network theory, one type of analysis of such interdependencies already 
mentioned is usually done under the robustness (or, in the contrary, vulnerability) epigraph 
[Boccaletti et al., 2006]. It refers to the ability of a network to avoid malfunctioning when a 
fraction of its constitutive elements is damaged. In technical infrastructures, this turns to be a 
field of elementary practical reasons since it affects directly the efficiency of the processes 
taking place in the network and it can give hints about the resilience of the grid. The analysis of 
the robustness of a complex system has been done, traditionally, from two points of view: static 
and dynamic. In a static robustness analysis, nodes are deleted without the need of redistributing 
any quantity transported by the network [Albert et al., 2000; Crucitti et al., 2003]. In a dynamic 
robustness analysis, nodes are deleted and the flow or load carried by them must be distributed 
over the rest of the remaining network [Moreno et al., 2002; Motter & Lai, 2002; Crucitti et al., 
2003; Kinney et al., 2005]. At first glance, the theoretical approach to these two types of 
robustness seems quite similar, but while static one can be analytically treated, dynamic one 
must be, almost always, numerically solved. 
 
In this letter, the static robustness of the European and most of the European countries and 
regions electricity transport power grids are investigated. Their tolerance to random loss 
(failures) and selective removal (attacks) of the most connected nodes is analyzed. In order to 
simplify its topological representation, a simple model of the power grid data is introduced. 
Final results and some features worth to notice are discussed in the last part of the letter. 
 
 3 
2 European power grid data 
In this paper, the vulnerability of the September 2003 actualization of the Union for the Co-
ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) map has been analyzed.1 UCTE associates 
most of the continental Europe national power grid operators in order to coordinate the 
production and demand of some annual 2,300 TWh and 450 million customers from 24 
countries. The map gives data from the transmission network (voltage levels from 110 kV to 
400 kV) and ignores the much more extended distribution one. Nonetheless, it deals with more 
than 3,000 nodes (generators and substations) and some 200.000 km of transmission lines. 
 
For more than fifty years UCTE has coordinated the international operation of high-voltage 
European countries’ grids to ensure adequate balances between offer and demand through 
national frontiers. It operates one of the largest electric synchronous interconnections worldwide 
in order to optimize the use of installed capacities and reduce the economic cost of power 
outages. But more than this, the UCTE transmission network has been shaped by those national 
policies and decisions that, for the last one hundred years, have been seeking economic 
prosperity, security and quality of life of its inhabitants. From that point of view, and differently 
from previous examples considered in the literature [Watts, 1999; Albert et al., 2004], those 
different power grids should be a good example of network evolution directed, at the same time, 
by technical, economical, political and, lastly, environmental decisions. Differentiated from 
country to country, we then would expect to find somehow different patterns and complex 
behaviour for every country or territory considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 An extremely simplified model for the transmission power grid: two voltage levels (400 kV and 220 kV for the 
European network) with generators G and loads L connected by switching stations S. Transformers T connect both 
tension levels in order to provide reliability, efficiency and control capacity. 
 
In order to simplify the analysis of the structure of the European power grid, an idealized view 
has been adopted (Fig. 1). On one hand, transmission lines have been assumed bidirectional, as 
it should be in the electricity transport network, and identical, ignoring the voltage level 
variation between lines and other physical characteristics. Although we have different voltage 
levels, the transport network works as a whole, using transformers to increase or decrease 
voltage depending on time and space requirements, and it would not be suitable or realistic to 
split it into different voltage networks, as it has been done in some literature [Crucitti et al., 
2005]. On the other hand, although it is possible to distinguish four different kinds of elements, 
namely generators, transformers, switches (considered as stations or substations of any kind) 
and, finally, end line points, all these elements have been treated identically in order to avoid, at 
this initial point of the study, those difficulties involved in their differentiation and dynamical 
behaviour characterization.  
                                                     
1 http://www.ucte.org 
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Fig. 2 The European electricity transport network (September 2003 actualization of the Union for the Co-ordination 
of Transmission of Electricity, UCTE, map) offers the upper topological image, where more than 3,000 nodes act as 
stations, substations, transformers and generators, connected by some 200,000 km of high voltage lines (up to 4,300 
edges approximately). A closer look gives a more accurate perspective of some national power grids: United 
Kingdom and Ireland, bottom left, and Italy, bottom right. Size, and colour as well, indicate the degree of every node: 
1 to 2 links, yellow; 3 to 4 links, purple; 5 to 6 links, green; and 7 to 8 links, red.  
 
 
 5 
Bearing these assumptions in mind, five different data sets have been analyzed: 
 
 UCTE as a whole.  
 UCTE, United Kingdom and Ireland as a whole. 
 UCTE, country by country, plus United Kingdom and Ireland. 
 Geographically related regions (Iberian Peninsula, Ireland as an island and England as 
an island). 
 Traditionally united or separated regions (formers Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and 
Federal and Democratic Republics of Germany). 
 
Until this time, and as far as we know, no such analysis has been done for the European power 
grid and with such depth of detail. A thorough analysis of these data sets will surely give hints 
of historical and geographical constraints that might have shaped the structure of the power grid 
from country to country, and from time to time. For example, from a geographical point of view, 
although neither United Kingdom nor Ireland belong to the UCTE, their isolated geography 
might have strongly configured and constrained their national power grids. Similarly, although 
Germany is actually united, the former frontier between Federal and Democratic Republics is 
still “visible” in form of a very few transmission lines connecting the east and the west of 
Germany. 
 
3 Small-world feature of the power grid 
The different data sets have been obtained after introducing their topological values, i.e. 
geographical positions of stations, substations and longitudes of lines, in a geographical 
information system (GIS) (Fig. 2). The national power grid for every country has been obtained 
from a typical GIS query: the selection of the part of the UCTE’s network constrained by every 
country’s frontier. So far, data analyses of 33 different networks have been performed.  
 
Using the formalism of graph theory, any of these networks can be described in terms of an 
graph  , defined as a pair,  EW , , where  iwW  ,  Ni ,...,1  is the set of N nodes and  ji wwE ,  is the set of edges or connections between nodes. Here,  jiji ww ,,   indicates 
that there is an edge (and thus a link) between nodes wi and wj. Two connected nodes are called 
adjacent, and the degree k of a given node is the number of edges connecting it with other nodes. 
In this case, the UCTE graph, UCTE , is defined as 
 

n
i
iUCTE
1
      (1) 
 
where  nii ,...,1  are the set of national power grids analyzed. 
 
As well as k, an additional property to be considered is the degree distribution  kP . This is 
defined as the (normalized) probability that a node chosen uniformly at random has a degree k 
or, similarly, as the fraction of nodes in the graph having k edges. In this sense, it has been 
suggested that degree distributions can be classified in three types, namely exponential 
(gaussian or random), potential (scale-free) or some mixture of both, exhibiting each one 
different dynamic characteristics and adaptive behaviours [Amaral et al., 2000]. Most of the real 
networks degree distributions follow a power law of the form    kkP  with the exponent  
being, mostly, between 2 and 3.  
 
For the five different data sets presented in Section 2, the graph model used considers 
undirected and unweighted edges. Though every single network contains hundreds of stations, 
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substations, transformers and thousands of km of energy transport lines, the results show a 
surprising unity in mean degree, very similar to those encountered in the literature [Watts, 1999; 
Albert et al., 2004] for networks of the same size. The relation between nodes and links is 
constant and goes around 8,2k  for every network analyzed (Fig. 3). As it has been shown 
in the literature [Gastner & Newman, 2004], though a rigorous demonstration of planarity is still 
elusive, this result agrees with that of other so called planar graphs like the US interstate 
highway network [Gastner & Newman, 2004], ant network of galleries [Buhl et al., 2004] and 
urban networks [Buhl et al., 2006]. This would suggests that, although every technical 
infrastructure has evolved and developed under different economical, political, historical and, 
luckily enough, environmental conditions and decisions, there should be some universal 
characteristics related, almost surely, to the spatial and technological constraints that rule the 
construction and evolution of such networks in order to give a so common value for k . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Linear relation between nodes and links implies uniform mean degree value for every network analyzed, in 
spite of their different economical, political, historical and environmental evolution processes. 
 
 
Every single network analyzed is uncorrelated (see below) and all of them follow an exponential 
cumulative probability degree distribution of the generic form 
 
     kdkkPkP
kkk
  exp'     (2) 
 
The value adopted by the exponent  of these single scaled distributions goes from a minimum 
of 91.0UK  (United Kingdom, with r2=0.898) to a maximum of 71.2PT  (Portugal, with 
r2=0.989). The  exponent of the UCTE graph reaches a value of 78.1UCTE , close to that of 
the North American power grid, as in Ref. [Albert et al., 2004]. The mean value for the whole 
data sets analyzed is 8.1  (Fig 4.a). 
 
The presence of degree correlations (namely if connected nodes share common properties such 
as similar degrees) is conducted by measuring the average nearest neighbours connectivity of a 
node with degree k, i.e. 
  


k
Cnn kkPkk      (3) 
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where  kkPC   is the conditional probability that a link belonging to a node with connectivity k 
points to a node with connectivity k’ [Pastor Satorras et al., 2001]. For we have independence 
on k, i.e. 
      kPkkPkkP CC      (4) 
 
and thus we have nnk  constant (Fig. 4, b). Though no degree correlations has been found for 
the European power grid, for systems such as the Internet, such correlation exists and it is found 
that  kknn  with 5,0 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Topological characteristics of the European power grid. (a) Cumulative degree distributions for the UCTE, 
(black dots, with exponential fitting), United Kingdom and Ireland (triangles) and Italy (squares) graphs. (b) Nearest 
neighbor degree correlation for the UCTE graph. 
 
 
As well as the degree distribution, the small world (SW) feature has been used to characterize 
the topological structure of a network [Watts & Strogatz, 1998]. The mathematical 
characterization of the SW behavior is based on the evaluation of two basic statistical 
properties: the clustering coefficient C, a measure of the average cliquishness of a node, and the 
characteristic path length d, a measure of the typical separation between two generic nodes in 
the network. On one hand, being  1 iji j   the set of nearest neighbors of a node Wwi  , 
the clustering coefficient for this node is defined as the number of connections between the 
components ijw  . By defining 
 



 
 kjk
jk
N
j
iji
i ;1
 ,     (5) 
 
we have   


 
2
i
iv iC , so that the clustering coefficient is the average over W, 
 


N
i
v iCN
C
1
1     (6) 
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and measures the average fraction of pairs of neighbors of a node that are also neighbors of each 
other. On the other hand, being  jid ,min  the minimum path length connecting two nodes 
Www ji ,  in  , we define the average path length of a given unit as  
 
   


N
j
v jidN
id
1
min ,
1      (7) 
 
and the path length for the graph as  idd v . Characterized by small path lengths and high 
local clustering coefficient, the emergence of the SW phenomenon in some different real 
technological networks [Barabási & Albert, 1999; Watts, 1999; Ferrer i Cancho et al., 2001; 
Albert et al., 2004] indicates that their connection topology is neither completely regular nor 
completely random: small-worlds are indeed highly clustered, like regular lattices, yet having 
small characteristic path lengths, like random graphs. 
 
Here we use two predictions from random graph topologies in order to compare them against 
the observed topological patterns [Ferrer i Cancho et al., 2001]: (1) the clustering coefficient 
over the average connectivity for a random graph follows an inverse scaling law with graph 
size: 
 
Nk
C rand 1       (8) 
 
and (2), the average path length scales logarithmically as  
 
 Nkd rand loglog       (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Small world patterns: distance (a) and clustering (b) for the power grids investigated. Real distance is corrected 
by a factor of log<k> and clustering by <k>. Dashed lines signal the expected values for random graphs. It can be 
seen that larger networks involve larger deviations from the random cases. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the values of d log<k> and C/<k> compared to those of 1/N and log(N), 
respectively, for the 33 different power grids analyzed. It can be seen that C/Crand >1 for most of 
the grids. Values of C/Crand of more than one order of magnitude are achieved by the largest 
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power grids while d/drand remains in the same order of magnitude for whatever size of the 
network. A similar pattern has been observed in electronic circuits [Ferrer i Cancho et al., 2001].  
 
From a structural point of view, every country’s grid has evolved in order to connect production 
sites with consumption sites within its own borders. In small countries everything is at hand and 
long distance connections are no needed to expand the grid. On the contrary, in big countries 
(and consequently, with an increasing number of nodes) long distance connections become 
more and more necessary when connecting production and consumption. At the top UCTE level, 
the need to exchange energy between countries forces long distance connections to cross 
borders and to connect sites never connected before. 
 
4 Static tolerance to errors and attacks 
The usual approach to the analysis of networks’ static tolerance to errors and attacks seeks the 
relation between node deletion (without the need of redistributing any quantity transported by 
the network) and global connectivity (existence and relative size of the connected component, 
after such a deletion). An error simulation would be based on the random deletion of nodes 
while an attack simulation would be based on the deletion in decreasing order of the most 
connected (higher degree) ones. The experimental results for the 33 different power grid 
networks are shown in Fig. 6(b). Under random failure, simulations show a monotonically 
decrease of the relative network size of the connected component S with the increasing fraction f 
of nodes eliminated (orange circles). On the other hand, selective removal of the most connected 
nodes (blue dots), shows a much more dramatic size reduction of the connected component for 
the same fraction of nodes eliminated. This fact, in agreement with similar investigations done, 
for example, with ant galleries of networks [Buhl et al., 2004] and street networks of urban 
settlements [Buhl et al., 2006], clearly suggests different network behaviour upon different 
forms of static deletion of nodes. 
 
In addition to numerical results [Albert et al., 2000; Motter & Lai, 2002; Crucitti et al., 2003],  
the analytical approach to study tolerance to errors and attacks has been traditionally based in 
percolation theory. In this sense, the network percolates below a critical probability fc related to 
the presence or absence of a specific number of edges. Its study can be then mapped into a 
standard percolation problem for errors and, with few modifications, for attacks as well 
[Boccaletti et al., 2006]. Specifically for the static tolerance to errors, it has been shown 
[Molloy & Reed, 1998] that the condition for having a giant component S∞ in a graph   is 
 
    0222  
k
kPkkkk     (10) 
 
For randomly deleted nodes, it has been shown [Cohen et al., 2000] that the critical fraction fc is  
 
 111 2  kkfc      (11) 
 
Considering the exponential degree distribution of the European power grid (Eq. 1), we have 
k  and 22 2k , and thus 
 
12
11  cf      (12) 
 
For 8.1 , we have a predicted value 61.0cf . The experimental values of fc for the random 
removal of nodes and for the different data sets analyzed are shown in Fig. 7.  
 10 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
f
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
S
f
c
=0.61
f=0.05 
f=0.2 
a 
b 
f=0.3 f=0.5 
f=0.1 f=0.25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Static tolerance to failures and attacks for the 33 networks analyzed (United Kingdom and Ireland power grid 
graph taken as an example). (a) United Kingdom and Ireland power grid original spatial graph, with the most 
connected nodes highlighted in red. (b) Static tolerance to random (orange) and selective (blue) removal of a fraction 
f of nodes, measured by the relative size S of the largest connected component for every network analyzed (with an 
analytically found critical fraction fc = 0.61 for the random case). Whiskers stand for the standard deviation. For the 
sample power grid (United Kingdom and Ireland), snapshot figures illustrate three random (upper orange) and three 
selective (lower blue) experimental results. For the United Kingdom and Ireland power grid, a progressive random 
removal of nodes gives a completely disconnected graph when a fraction fc   0.5 is reached, while selective removal 
of the most connected ones causes the grid to reach this limit sooner, for fc   0.25 (in this last case, nodes 
highlighted in red note those ones prone to disappear at the next time step). 
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As we can see, the value of the critical fraction remains quite invariable and independent of the 
network size, as it should be for exponential degree distribution networks, and in completely 
agreement with the predicted value of fc. An equivalent study for the case of static tolerance to 
attacks will be presented elsewhere.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Experimental values for the random removal critical fraction fc for every data set analyzed, as a function of the 
network size N. All values move around the predicted critical fraction fc =1-[1 / (2 - 1)] (dashed line). 
 
 
As it has been stated previously, the degree distributions of the different European power grids 
analyzed are exponential. That means that they are not like the highly skewed scale-free 
distributions typically found in other complex networks. In scale free networks, the degree 
distribution follows a power law, where a very few nodes have many connections and most 
nodes have few connections. Instead, planar networks in general, and the European power grid 
in particular, display less skewed exponential or uniform degree distributions.  
 
Networks with highly skewed link distribution characterized by power laws appear very 
sensitive to losing those highly connected nodes (or hubs), while relatively robust to randomly 
losing the more highly abundant, less connected ones. In contrast, random networks with 
Poisson degree distribution, which are relatively unskewed, since nodes have similar number of 
connections, like power grids, should display similar responses to random and selective removal 
of nodes [Albert et al., 2000]. The results presented insofar suggest, as it has been done for food 
webs [Solé & Montoya, 2001; Dunne et al., 2002], that networks with exponential degree 
distributions would be, in fact, sensitive to different types of static node removals, more alike to 
scale-free networks than random or gaussian ones. In a nutshell: exponential, but not that much. 
In spite of this, these behaviours (Fig. 6, b) seem to correlate well with an exponential function 
of the general form 
  fS   exp       (13) 
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where S is the relative size of the connected component and f is the fraction of nodes removed.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8 Static tolerance to random (open circles) and selective (filled circles) removal of nodes, plotted as a function of 
the network size N and the  value of the exponential functions that correlate those behaviours from Fig. 4. For the 
selective case (filled circles), the subtle though obvious dispersion from the linear fitting could stand for its different 
behaviour than that of a random removal, observed in Fig. 6,b.  
 
 
The relation between  and the size of the networks has been plotted in log – linear axes, in Fig. 
8. As we can see, as the size of the network increases, the value of the  exponent that better fits 
Eq. (6), increases at the same time. Quite intuitively, as more and more elements are introduced 
in the network, more prone is the system to failures, whether they come from selective or 
random removal, and its fragility increases as well. The more counterintuitive result arises from 
the fact that the increase in the value of  is logarithmic with the size of the network. In the case 
of random failure, the results are very well correlated (r2 = 0.99) by the logarithmic  function   rrr N   ln , with 95.0r  and 34.0r , where  is the exponent of the exponential 
function that fits the results of Fig. 6(b) and N is the size of the network. The results in the case 
of selective attack, though offer a different observed response to deletion of nodes than that of a 
random removal, are also very well correlated (r2 = 0.95) by the function   sss N   ln , 
with 81.0s  and 56.0s . 
 
5 Discussion 
The robustness of real-world networks to the random loss of nodes (‘errors’) and its fragility to 
the selective loss of the most connected ones (‘attacks’) has been attributed to extremely skewed 
power-law distributions of links found in many small-world networks [Albert et al., 2000]. Our 
study shows that these responses are not unique to small-world, scale-free networks. Every 
single power grid studied, which have less skewed exponential degree distributions and often 
lack typical small-world topology, display similar patterns of response to node loss. Moreover, 
the difference to network response to errors and attacks appears related only to network size and 
                                                     
2 The higher the value of , the less skewed the function is. 
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not to other topological measures of network complexity such as mean degree or betweenness 
centrality, for example (data not shown).  
 
The evolution of both, the static tolerance to random and selective removal of nodes, plotted as 
a function of the network size and the exponent value of the exponential functions that correlate 
their node removal behaviour (Fig. 4), shows two immediate facts worth to notice: fragility 
increases with the size of the network and it is clearly logarithmic. We might think, rather 
intuitively, that the more elements are present in a system, the higher the probability that it fails. 
But as far as we observe the relation between the relative size S of the largest connected 
component and the fraction f of nodes deleted, the results of these static simulations should 
exhibit similar behaviours, quite independent of the size of the networks. On the other hand, if 
we consider that the increase in size of the networks is a sign of spatial or temporal evolutions, 
the logarithmic behaviour of the fragility with size would suggest that, though size favours 
fragility, evolution can, relatively, reduce it.  
 
Recent newsworthy wide-area electrical blackouts and failures have raised many questions 
about the specifics of such events and the vulnerability of interconnected power systems. With 
the ever-growing demand for power and reliability, actual planning strategies to increase 
transmission systems lack basic information about the grid’s complexity. One possible way to 
prevent propagation of disturbances is to design the system to allow for intentional separation 
into stable islands or interrupt small amounts of load [Madani & Novosel, 2005]. If grid’s 
resilience to attacks and failures is somehow related to its size and dimensions, an accurate 
power grid reliability analysis would have to take into account its relative increase in 
vulnerability in order to finally give a minimal definition of this stable island. From a spatial 
point of view, the definition of a geographical stable island would facilitate and improve the 
treatment of several different aspects related to power grid design and functioning, ranging from 
deregulation to spatial load forecasting and maintenance. 
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